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1. *Deadline*
March 4, '49
met 2 March 11a

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Washington 25, DC

9 Mar.

25X1A

10 February 1949

TO: Admiral R. H. Billenhoetter
Director of Central Intelligence

The Ad Hoc Committee, of which I am the Senior Member, has been charged by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the task of evaluating the effect of the strategic air offensive contemplated in current war plans on the Soviet war effort, and of appraising the psychological effect of atomic bombing on the Soviet will to wage war.

It is most important that this Committee be aware of the known levels of the Soviet production of materials essential to the prosecution of war. Furthermore, since 1945 the Soviet Union has been cognizant of the existence and the potential threat to them of atomic bombs and of the probable intention of the United States to use such weapons in the event of war. Being forewarned, it is logical to expect that measures to minimize the effects of atomic bombing may be undertaken by the USSR.

The Committee would greatly appreciate such information as your Agency could furnish on the following items:

PRODUCTION

1. What is the estimated productive capacity of the USSR, satellite countries under soviet domination, and of the remainder of continental Europe in the following items (any appropriate measure is acceptable):

- a. Steel
- b. Petroleum production
- c. Petroleum refining
- d. Aviation gasoline
- e. Chemicals
- f. Synthetic rubber
- g. Motor vehicles
- h. Guns

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- j. Railroad equipment
- k. Electrical equipment
- l. Electronic equipment
- m. Shipbuilding
- n. Machine tools
- o. Bearings
- p. Airframes
- q. Aircraft engines

(b) 2. Confirmation is desired as to the distribution of the productive capacity in certain critical items among the urban areas shown in Enclosure "A". (Minor discrepancies are not of particular concern).

3. Is excess productive capacity being developed in critical systems?

4. With what degree of accuracy do you consider your agency is able to estimate the level and distribution of Soviet productive capacity?

3. STOCKPILING

1. To what extent is the USSR stockpiling:

- a. Military supplies
- b. ICL products
- c. Food

2. What is the general plan of such stockpiling?

3. Where are known stock piles located?

4. DISASTER PREPARATION

1. What measures, which would minimize the effects of atomic attack, are being taken by the USSR?

2. What extensive disaster control procedures, including radiological defence measures, have been promulgated?

3. What process of dispersion into self-sufficient areas or into separated compartments is taking place in Soviet industry?

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4. Is the Soviet transportation system in process of being parallelled, and are present or previously existing vulnerable focal points being bypassed?
5. Is the construction of underground factories, shelters, command posts or hangars in process?
6. Are any installations being camouflaged?
7. Are the Soviets practising deception and as well as security in regard to their industrial capacity and stock piles?

The Committee would also appreciate your view as to the existence and reliability of any organised underground which is potentially capable of assuming or being placed in control of the Government of the USSR in the event of collapse of the existing Soviet regime.

Very truly yours,

H. R. HARMON
Lt. General, USAF

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